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and	 differential	 treatment.	 In	 developing	 this	 perspective,	 Cass	 Sunstein’s	 theory	 of	 the	
incompletely	theorised	agreement	is	utilised	to	understand	and	interrogate	the	core	features	
of	 special	 and	 differential	 treatment.	 Using	 this	 analytical	 lens,	 the	 article	 traces	 the	
construction	of	 special	 and	differential	 treatment	as	 an	 incompletely	 theorised	agreement	
and	 elucidates	 on	 the	 consequences	 of	 this	 for	 the	 operation	 of	 special	 and	 differential	
treatment	 as	 an	 effective	 tool	 to	 address	 the	 development,	 financial	 and	 trade	 needs	 of	
developing	 countries.	 The	 article	 will	 then	 evaluate	 recent	 changes	 to	 SDT	 which	 can	 be	
construed	as	an	effort	to	more	completely	theorise	SDT.	The	article	will	conclude	by	positing	
that	special	and	differential	currently	resides	within	a	liminal	or	transitional	space.	By	tracing	













	WTO,	Committee	on	Trade	and	Development	 (CTD),	 ‘Special	and	Differential	Treatment	Provisions	 in	WTO	









assistance	 and	 capacity	 building	 as	 well	 as	 the	 structuring	 of	 looser	 rules	 on	 market	
protection.5	 SDT	 is	 also	 a	 fundamental	 element	 of	 multilateral	 trade	 negotiations.6	 In	
launching	the	Doha	Round,	for	example,	Members	directed	that	SDT	should	be	an	integral	






country	 and	 LDC	 dissatisfaction	 regarding	 SDT.8	 Such	 dissatisfaction	 culminated	 in	 the	













Review,	 2004,	 27(2):	 291	 -	 317,	 at	 292.	 See	 also	 John	 Whalley,	 ‘Special	 and	 Differential	 Treatment	 in	 the	










is	devoted	 to	 the	grant	of	 special	 and	differential	 treatment,	 technical	 cooperation	and	 capacity	building	as	




Held	 on	 24	 March	 1999’,	 (12	 April	 1999)	 WT/GC/M/39,	 at	 paragraph	 8.	 See	 also	 the	 statement	 of	 the	





2001)	 WT/MIN(01)/17,	 at	 paragraph	 13	 (i)	 [hereinafter	 Implementation	 Decision].	 A	 compilation	 of	













of	 SDT	 and	 find	 that	 many	 are	 incompletely	 theorised	 in	 terms	 of	 how	 they	 are	 to	 be	
operationalised	 to	 meet	 the	 relevant	 developmental,	 financial	 and	 trade	 needs	 of	
developing	 countries	 and	 LDCs.	Operationalisation	of	 SDT	was	often	 left	 to	 the	discretion	




is	 required.	 	By	analysing	a	 range	of	SDT	provisions,	 I	offer	 some	suggestions	on	how	and	
when	 more	 complete	 theorisation	 of	 SDT	 may	 be	 useful.	 In	 so	 doing,	 I	 pay	 particular	
attention	 to	 a	 number	 of	 developments	 within	 the	 WTO	 and	 also	 scrutinise	 the	 WTO	
Agreement	on	Trade	Facilitation	(TFA).	This	agreement	entered	into	force	in	February	2017	
and,	 as	 outlined	 in	 a	 previous	 article	 by	 this	 author,	 contains	 a	 range	 of	 innovative	 SDT	






law	 are	 not	 self-evident	 but	 instead	 are	 constructed,	 and	 moreover	 may	 change,	 over	
time.13	 Accordingly,	 as	 I	will	 demonstrate,	what	 the	 TFA	 allows	 us	 to	 do	 is	 dismantle	 the	
existing	construction	of	SDT	so	that	we	may	‘reimagine’	the	trade	law	project	as	a	whole.14	
The	 article	 will	 conclude	 by	 positing	 that	 special	 and	 differential	 currently	 resides	 within	
what	we	may	call	a	 liminal	 space.	By	using	 the	 term	 liminal,	 I	 intend	to	evoke	 the	 idea	of	
transition	and	the	stepping	onto	the	threshold	of	something	new	but	at	the	same	time	still	

















This	article	builds	on	earlier	work	by	 the	author	which	 sought	 to	 frame	SDT	as	akin	 to	an	
incomplete	contract.15	By	utilising	 the	 tools	of	economic	contract	 theory	 to	analyse	SDT,	 I	
was	 able	 to	 argue	 for	 what	 in	 effect	 amounts	 to	 a	 life	 cycle	 analysis	 of	 SDT.	 While	
acknowledging	 the	 utility	 of	 economic	 contract	 theory	 for	 analysing	 SDT,	 this	 article	
attempts	to	address	a	particular	aspect	which	economic	contract	theory	cannot	address.	In	
essence,	 contractarian	 analysis	 is	 not	 particularly	 sensitive	 to	 normative	 concerns.	 This	
article	therefore	attempts	to	address	this	omission	in	my	earlier	analysis	of	SDT.		
	
The	 next	 section	 will	 provide	 an	 introduction	 to	 Sunstein’s	 concept	 of	 incompletely	
theorised	agreements.	This	will	be	followed	in	section	two	with	an	overview	of	the	current	
provisions	 on	 SDT	 within	 the	 WTO.	 I	 then	 marry	 together	 the	 analysis	 of	 the	 previous	
sections	 to	 sketch	 the	 contours	 of	 SDT	 as	 an	 incompletely	 theorised	 agreement.	 The	
ramifications	 of	 the	 construction	 of	 SDT	 as	 an	 incompletely	 theorised	 agreement	 will	 be	
discussed	in	section	three	before	attention	is	turned	in	section	four	to	discussing	the	likely	
future	of	SDT.	 In	this	section,	 I	conceptualise	SDT	as	residing	within	a	 liminal	–	 in	essence,	
transitional	–	space.	In	section	five,	I	conclude	and	in	doing	so,	argue	that	there	is	a	pressing	
need	 to	 garner	 a	 range	 of	 conceptual	 tools	 to	 allow	 for	 a	 robust	 critique	 of	 future	 SDT	
proposals	to	channel	debate	on	the	development	of	this	area	of	trade	law	and	practice.	This	
article	 begins	 this	 quest	 for	 new	 conceptual	 tools	 by	 analysing	 Sunstein’s	 incompletely	
theorised	 agreement	 which,	 as	 we	 will	 see,	 provides	 a	 powerful	 critical	 framework	 for	
analysing	such	provisions	in	the	future.		
Before	 I	begin,	a	number	of	 caveats	must	be	acknowledged.	The	 first	of	 these	 is	 that	 this	
article	 does	 not	 provide	 an	 exhaustive	 account	 of	 the	 development	 of	 SDT	 within	 the	









	 This	 has	 been	 done	 very	 well	 by	 other	 authors.	 See,	 for	 example,	 Raj	 Bhala,	 ‘Theological	 Categories	 for	
Special	and	Differential	Treatment’,	Kansas	Law	Review,	(2002)	50	(4):	635	–	693,	Uché	Eweluka,	‘Special	and	
Differential	Treatment	in	International	Trade	Law:	A	Concept	in	Search	of	Content’,	North	Dakota	Law	Review,	
(2003)	 79:	 831;	 Edwini	 Kessie,	 ‘Enforceability	 of	 the	 Legal	 Provisions	 Relating	 to	 Special	 and	 Differential	
Treatment	Under	the	WTO	Agreements’,	Journal	of	World	Intellectual	Property,	(2000)	3	(6):	955	-	975;	William	
Kerr,	 ‘Special	and	Differential	Treatment:	A	Mechanism	to	Promote	Development?’,	The	Estey	Centre	Journal	
of	 International	 Law	 and	 Trade	 Policy,	 (2005)	 6	 (2):	 84;	 W	 Kerr,	 ‘Special	 and	 Differential	 Treatment:	 A	
Mechanism	to	Promote	Development?’,	The	Estey	Centre	Journal	of	International	Law	and	Trade	Policy,	(2005)	
6	 (2):	 84;	 Edwini	 Kessie,	 "The	 Legal	 Status	 of	 Special	 and	Differential	 Treatment	 Provisions	Under	 the	WTO	
Agreements,"	in	WTO	Law	and	Developing	Countries,	George	Bermann	and	Petros	Mavroidis,	eds.	(Cambridge:	





more	 comprehensive	 analysis.	 In	 addition,	 while	 the	 framework	 of	 the	 incompletely	
theorised	agreement	is	adopted	as	a	conceptual	lens	for	our	analysis,	this	is	not	intended	as	
a	 call	 to	 arms	 against	 incompletely	 theorised	 agreements	 in	 general.	 Rather,	 this	work	 is	
intended	 to	 draw	 attention	 to	 how	 at	 times;	 fuller	 theorisation	 of	 agreements	 and/or	
understandings	 may	 be	 required	 to	 guard	 against	 the	 risk	 of	 bias,	 self-interest	 and	
inconsistency.	 The	 frame	of	 the	 incompletely	 theorised	agreement	 is	 therefore	utilised	as	
both	an	evaluative	and	programmatic	 tool	 for	analysis	of	 future	provisions	of	SDT.	Finally,	
while	 in	 the	penultimate	and	concluding	sections	 I	 comment	on	 the	pertinent	question	of	
‘where	next’	for	special	and	differential	treatment,	I	am	also	cognizant	that	such	a	question	










	 ‘[i]ncompletely	 theorised	agreements	play	a	pervasive	 role	 in	 law	and	 society.	 It	 is	
	 rare	for	a	person,	and	especially	a	group,	to	theorise	any	subject	completely	--	that	
	 is,	to	accept	both	a	highly	abstract	theory	and	a	series	of	steps	that	relate	the	theory	
	 to	 a	 concrete	 conclusion.	 In	 fact,	 people	 often	 reach	 incompletely	 theorised	
	 agreements	on	a	general	principle.	 Such	agreements	are	 incompletely	 theorised	 in	
	 the	sense	that	people	who	accept	the	principle	need	not	agree	on	what	it	entails	in	
	 particular	cases.’20		
It	 is	 clear	 that	 an	 incompletely	 theorised	 agreement	 may	 arise	 at	 various	 levels	 of	
abstraction.	First,	as	indicated	above,	such	agreements	may	arise	where	there	is	agreement	
upon	 a	 general	 principle	 but	 no	 consensus	 upon	 how	 the	 principle	 applies	 in	 particular	
situations.21	 People	 may	 hence	 believe	 that	 murder	 is	 wrong	 but	 may	 disagree	 on	 the	
subject	of	abortion.	Second,	agreement	may	be	secured	on	a	 so-called	mid-level	principle	


























for	 stability.29	 This	 concept	 of	 stability	 links	 well	 with	 the	 ‘ideal’	 of	 legal	 certainty	 which	
oftentimes	acts	as	a	‘regulative	idea’.30	However,	it	has	been	noted	that	this	perception	of	
law	 has	 a	 tendency	 to	 lead	 lawyers	 to	 forget	 about	 or	 indeed	 ignore	 the	 ‘political	
foundations’	 of	 legitimacy.31	 It	 is	 therefore	 essential	 that	 stability	 is	 not	 pursued	 to	 the	
detriment	of	a	legitimate	system	of	law	and	governance.	We	will	return	to	this	point	in	due	
course.		
Silence	 may	 also	 allow	 for	 learning	 and	 the	 development	 of	 consensus	 at	 some	 future	
date.32	To	 this	end,	 the	very	 fact	of	 law-making	 in	a	diverse	society	means	 that	 it	will	not	
always	 be	 desirable	 or	 indeed	 possible	 to	 fully	 theorise	 a	 particular	 area	 of	 law.	 This	 is	
because	 fuller	 theorisation	may	 prove	 to	 be	 overly	 contentious	 and	may	 be,	 in	 practical	
terms,	impossible.	Thus,	if	a	workable	agreement	can	be	reached,	it	should	not	matter	that	
the	 ‘grand	 theory’	 which	 accounts	 for	 the	 agreement	 is	 not	 fully	 theorised.	 Hence,	 for	
Sunstein,	 an	 agreement	 which	 is	 completely	 theorised	 may	 be	 unable	 to	 accommodate	
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Incompletely	 theorised	 agreements	 are	 relatively	 commonplace	 within	 the	 international	
legal	sphere	with,	for	example,	the	formation	of	the	Universal	Declaration	of	Human	Rights	
marked	 by	 a	 lack	 of	 agreement	 upon	 the	 ‘high-level’	 theory	 behind	 it.36	 However,	 it	
provided	 a	 framework	 upon	 which	more	 progressive	 understandings	 could	 be	 built.37	 By	
extension,	it	has	been	argued	that	the	importance	of	human	rights	and	associated	discourse	
is	 that	 it	provides	a	 framework	 for	 conversation	and	dialogue	about	 the	values,38	 thereby	
illustrating	where	there	is	agreement	before	going	on	to	try	and	obtain	further	agreement	
at	a	much	lower	level	of	abstraction.		







such	 questions	 and	 transfer	 their	 analysis	 to	 a	 level	where	 they	 are	more	 likely	 to	 reach	
agreement	with	other	relevant	parties.	Hence,	to	leave	a	particular	issue	unresolved	may	be	
meritorious	in	that	it	may	save	a	great	deal	of	time	negotiating	upon	an	issue	in	relation	to	
which	 agreement	 may	 never	 be	 possible.	 Accordingly,	 ‘[w]hat	 is	 said	 and	 resolved	 is	 no	
more	important	than	what	is	left	out.’41	
Summing	 up,	 the	 incompletely	 theorised	 agreement	 may	 be	 a	 useful	 device	 to	 promote	
stability	 where	 open	 ended	 conversations	 on	 particular	 issues	 are	 liable	 to	 produce	
tensions.	However,	it	must	also	be	discerned	whether	any	shortcomings	are	associated	with	




	 See	 generally,	 Anne	 van	 Aaken,	 ‘International	 Investment	 Law:	 Between	 Commitment	 and	 Flexibility:	 A	


















Accordingly,	 Sunstein	 has	 recognised	 that	 the	 benefits	 of	 an	 incompletely	 theorised	





of,	 for	 example,	 just	 outcomes	 in	 relation	 to	 a	 particular	 sector	 of	 society,	 the	 stability	
provided	will	be	short-term	in	duration.	It	is	hence	clear	that	stability	is	not	an	‘overriding’	
social	 good	 to	 be	 striven	 for	 at	 the	 expense	 of	 all	 other	 goals	 or	 values.45	 Thus	 Sunstein	




argued	 that	 the	 actual	 construction	 of	 the	 legal	 provisions	 of	 SDT	 was	 such	 as	 to	 deny	
developing	countries	the	ability	to	articulate	their	development,	financial	and	trade	needs.	
Given	that	these	provisions	are	founded	upon	the	notion	that	they	should	meet	such	needs,	





In	 this	 section,	 we	 utilise	 the	 analytical	 frame	 provided	 by	 the	 incompletely	 theorised	
agreement	 to	 interrogate	 the	 way	 in	 which	 the	 provisions	 of	 special	 and	 differential	
treatment	are	constructed.		
From	 the	 outset	 of	 the	 GATT	 in	 1947,	 just	 under	 half	 of	 the	 organisation’s	 membership	
could	 be	 termed	 developing.48	 The	 relationship	 between	 developed	 and	 developing	
























cater	 to	 the	 development,	 financial	 and	 trade	 needs	 of	 developing	 countries.	 Since	 there	




equitable	 only	 among	 equals.’50	 Similar	 sentiments	were	 expressed	 in	 a	 statement	 to	 the	
United	Nations	Conference	on	Trade	and	Development	 [UNCTAD]	 in	 the	same	year	 to	the	
effect	 that	 ‘no	matter	 how	 valid	 the	 principle	 of	 [most-favoured-nation]	may	 be	 in	 trade	
relations	 between	 equals,	 it	 is	 not	 an	 acceptable	 and	 adequate	 concept	 for	 trade	 among	
countries	with	highly	unequal	economic	power.’51		
Throughout	the	early	years	of	the	GATT,	developing	countries	therefore	sought	differential	
treatment	 based	 upon	 what	 they	 conceived	 of	 as	 their	 fundamental	 difference	 from	
developed	countries.52	Legal	change	would,	however,	soon	come	about	with	amendments	
to	GATT	Article	XVIII	 during	 the	1954-1955	GATT	 review	 session	 to	provide,	 inter	alia,	 for	
developing	 countries	 to	 utilise	 quantitative	 restrictions	 for	 balance-of-payments	
difficulties.53	This	was	followed	in	1964	with	a	further	amendment	to	the	GATT	to	include	a	
new	Part	 IV	on	Trade	and	Development.54	 The	new	Part	 IV	 introduced	 three	new	Articles	
into	the	GATT,	the	first	of	which,	Article	XXXVI	on	Principles	and	Objectives,	recognised	the	
need	for	rapid	and	sustained	expansion	of	the	export	earnings	of	developing	countries.	This	
was	 to	 be	 achieved	 through	 more	 favourable	 market	 access	 conditions	 for	 products	 of	
interest	 to	 developing	 countries	 and	 the	 diversification	 of	 the	 economies	 of	 developing	
countries	 to	 avoid	 excessive	 dependence	 upon	 primary	 products.	 Of	 greater	 significance	
was	 the	 introduction	 of	 the	 principle	 of	 ‘non-reciprocity’	 whereby;	 ‘[t]he	 developed	















and	 5	March	 1955’	 (1955)	 BISD	 3S/170;	GATT,	 ‘Protocol	 Amending	 the	 Preamble	 and	 Parts	 II	 and	 III	 of	 the	
GATT’	(3	October	1955)	GATT	Doc.	PROT/6,	BISD	3S/79	(1955).		
54
	GATT,	 ‘Protocol	Amending	the	GATT	to	 Introduce	a	Part	 IV	on	Trade	and	Development’	 (8	February	1965)	
GATT	Doc.	PROT/2/62,	L/2314;	GATT	BISD	13S/2,	572.		
55
	 GATT	Article	 XXXVI:8;	 See	 also	GATT,	 ‘Differential	 and	More	 Favourable	 Treatment	Reciprocity	 and	 Fuller	





non-reciprocal	preferential	 tariff	 treatment	 to	be	granted	 in	 favour	of	developing	 country	
imports.56	 Initially	authorised	for	ten	years,	such	preferential	tariff	schemes,	known	by	the	
moniker	the	generalised	system	of	preferences	(GSP),	were	given	a	permanent	legal	basis	by	
way	 the	 1979	 Decision	 on	 ‘Differential	 and	 More	 Favourable	 Treatment	 Reciprocity	 and	
Fuller	 Participation	 of	 Developing	 Countries.’	 This	 set	 out	 that,	 ‘notwithstanding	 the	
provisions	of	Article	I	of	the	General	Agreement,	contracting	parties	may	accord	differential	
and	more	 favourable	 treatment	 to	developing	countries	without	affording	such	 treatment	
to	other	contracting	parties.’57	Intended	to	provide	durable	legal	authorisation	for	the	GSP,	
this	 decision,	 commonly	 termed	 the	 ‘Enabling	 Clause’,	 detailed	 that	 such	 differential	 and	
more	 favourable	 treatment	would	apply	 to	preferential	 treatment	accorded	by	developed	
contracting	parties	to	products	from	developing	countries	under	the	GSP.		
The	Enabling	Clause	contains	no	time	limits	and	is	in	force	today,	having	been	incorporated	
into	 the	 GATT	 1994.58	 In	 addition	 to	 granting	 permanent	 permission	 for	 the	 GSP,	 the	
Enabling	 Clause	 also	 authorised	 tariff	 preferences	 between	 developing	 countries,	 more	
favourable	 treatment	 for	 developing	 countries	 with	 regard	 to	 non-tariff	 barriers	 to	 trade	
and	more	favourable	treatment	for	the	least	developed	of	the	developing	country	group.	A	
‘graduation	 clause’	 was	 introduced	 into	 the	 Enabling	 Clause	 such	 that	 while	 developed	
countries	 would	 not	 expect	 reciprocity	 from	 developing	 countries	 which	 would	 be	
inconsistent	 with	 their	 development,	 financial	 and	 trade	 needs,	 it	 was	 noted	 that	 the	
capacity	 of	 developing	 countries	 to	 make	 contributions	 would	 improve	 with	 their	
progressive	 development.59	 SDT	 would	 not,	 therefore,	 consist	 of	 an	 open-ended	 non-
reciprocal	relationship.	As	articulated	by	the	former	GATT	Director	General,	Oliver	Long,		
The	contention	that	equality	of	treatment	creates	a	condition	of	inequality	between	











1994,	 para.	 1(b)(iv);	 see	 also	 European	 Communities—Conditions	 for	 the	 Granting	 of	 Tariff	 Preferences	 to	





procedures	of	 the	General	Agreement	would	 improve	with	 the	progressive	development	of	 their	economies	






While	 the	 above	 elucidation	 of	 the	 development	 of	 differential	 treatment	 in	 favour	 of	
developing	countries	 in	the	GATT	would	seem	to	 indicate	that	developed	Members	of	the	
GATT	 were	 supportive	 of	 the	 grant	 of	 such	 treatment,	 this	 was	 not	 the	 case.61	 Rather,	




[W]hile	 self-interest	 surely	 explains	 many	 of	 the	 inconsistencies	 and	 exceptions	
	 that	 riddle	 multilateral	 trade	 agreements	 that	 resulted	 largely	 from	
	 (industrialised		countries’)	 leadership	 of	 the	 international	 trade	 regime,	 other	
	 explanations	 seem	 also	 to	 carry	 at	 least	 partial	 weight…	 They	 may	 have	
	 pragmatically	 conceded	 to	 political	 pressures	 in	 particular	 contexts	 in	 order	 to	
	 keep	the	larger	progressionist	model	on	course.63		
It	 has	 been	 similarly	 contended	 that	 the,	 ‘goal	 of	 (the)	GSP	was	 to	 obtain	 support	 of	 the	
developing	countries	 for	 the	GATT	system.’64	During	 the	1960s	and	1970s,	 the	developing	
country	group	dominated	UNCTAD	was	deemed	as	a	 threat	 to	 the	existence	of	 the	GATT,	
prompting	a	resigned	acceptance	on	the	behalf	of	the	developed	countries	that	‘something	
would	 have	 to	 be	 done’	 about	 the	 preference	 issue.65	 Such	 ‘formal	 prescriptive	
differentiation’	to	ensure	developing	country	support	was	not	only	a	fundamental	element	
of	 the	 trade	 regime	but	 also	 existed	 in	other	 areas	of	 international	 law	 such	 as	 the	1990	
London	Amendments	to	the	1987	Montreal	Protocol	on	Substances	that	deplete	the	Ozone	
Layer.66	
Within	 the	 trade	 regime,	 there	 may	 have	 been	 acceptance	 of	 the	 notion	 of	 differential	
treatment	 as	 a	 ‘response’	 to	 developing	 country	 needs	 but	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 such	



























treatment	 as	 ‘exceptions’,	 developed	 countries	 were	 able	 to	 construct	 the	 trade	 regime	
they	 wanted	 since	 developing	 country	 demands	 were	 conceptualised	 as	 ‘different’	 and	
outside	 the	 normal	 trade	 regime	 system.69	 The	 provisions	 of	 differential	 treatment	 for	
developing	countries	agreed	to	under	the	GATT	thus	constituted	in	the	main	‘an	agreement	
to	 disagree’	 but	 failed	 to	 act	 as	 a	 staging	 post	 to	more	 engaged	 discussions.	 This	 set	 the	
scene	 for	 attempts	 under	 the	 Uruguay	 Round	 of	 multilateral	 trade	 negotiations	 to	





differential	 and	 more	 favourable	 treatment	 focused	 upon	 granting	 developing	 countries	
special	rights	to	protect	their	markets	and	offered	them	enhanced	access	to	the	markets	of	
developed	 countries,71	 summarised	 elsewhere	 as	 the	 right–of-access	 and	 the	 right–to-	
																																								 																				
67






	 See	 generally	 Lamp,	 supra	 note	 12,	 at,	 744;	 who	 posits	 that,	 “during	 key	 episodes	 in	 the	 history	 of	 the	
trading	system,	the	developing	countries	did	not	seek	‘to	be	excepted	from	the	obligations	in	the	GATT’s	code	
of	 behaviour,’	 but	 rather	 sought	 to	 shape	 those	 obligations	 themselves.	 In	 these	 circumstances,	 granting	
exemptions	 and	 ‘special’	 treatment	 to	 developing	 countries	was	 a	 tool	 for	 developed	 countries	 to	 preserve	
their	preferred	design	of	the	trade	regime,	and	to	stick	to	their	preferred	method	of	making	trade	law,	while	





take	 seriously	 cultural	 and	 historical	 sensitivities.	 It	 is	 not	 against	 freer	 trade	 per	 se.	 Developmental	
multilateralism	appears	negative	only	when	set	against	the	steady	push	towards	small	government,	more	open	
markets	 and	 freer	 trade	 championed	 under	 the	 neoliberal	 approach	 to	 development.”	 See	 also	 in	 general	












protect.72	 However,	 the	 formation	 of	 the	 WTO	 ushered	 in	 a	 new	 era	 of	 special	 and	
differential	which	largely	replaced	such	concerns	with	an	emphasis	on	the	special	problems	
developing	 countries	 may	 incur	 in	 implementing	 the	 Uruguay	 Round	 agreements.73	 This	
emphasis	upon	‘implementation’	and	by	extension	compliance,	together	with	the	formation	
of	 the	 WTO	 as	 a	 single	 undertaking,	 is	 representative	 of	 a	 linear	 movement	 towards	
progress	with	progress	being	measured	as	 the	 ability	 of	 countries	 to	undertake	 the	 same	
legal	 commitments.	 Deborah	 Cass,	 however,	 noted	 that	 a	 linear	 presentation	 of	 history	
tends	 to	 bury	 inequalities	 which	 may	 lie	 at	 the	 foundational	 heart	 of	 some	 doctrinal	
developments.74	 Indeed,	 critical	 legal	 scholarship	 on	 the	 subject	 of	 international	 law	 has	
tended	 to	emphasise	how	 international	 law	 ‘constantly	 reiterates	 its	own	history	 so	as	 to	
present	the	field	as	a	narrative	of	inevitable	progress	and	modernisation.’75		
Drawing	on	the	above,	a	central	 tool	employed	 in	the	WTO	provisions	on	SDT	to	facilitate	
implementation	of	 the	Uruguay	Round	agreements	was	 the	 grant	of	 transition	periods	 to	
developing	 countries.76	 These	would	 have	 the	 effect	 of	 giving	 developing	 countries	 extra	
time	 to	 implement	 their	 commitments	 under	 the	 Uruguay	 Round	 agreements.	 These	
transition	periods	were	set	in	an	arbitrary	way	and	were	not	linked	to	the	particular	needs	
of	 developing	 countries	 or	 based	 on	 any	 substantive	 calculation	 of	 the	 difficulties	
developing	 countries	would	 face	 in	 implementation.77	 In	 this	 respect,	 the	 construction	 of	
SDT	in	the	form	of	transition	periods	granted	to	developing	countries	such	as	to	assist	in	the	
implementation	 of	 their	 trade	 commitments	 reveals	 an	 intrinsic	 belief	 that	 each	 of	 the	
WTO’s	agreements	was	suitable	for	each	Member	country.	Under	this	account,	it	is	not	the	
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the	 World	 Trade	 Organization’,	 Global	 Development	 Studies,	 no.2,	 2005,	
https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/3320.pdf,	 accessed	 1	
September	2017,	at	p	34,	 to	 the	effect	 that	one	view	of	developing	country	difficulties	 in	 implementing	 the	
Uruguay	Round	is	that	‘members	agreed	to	the	new	rules	(as,	by	consensus,	they	did),	then	we	must	assume	







operating	 as	 a	 general	 principle,	 the	 relevant	 provisions	 are	 tailored	 to	 the	 needs	 in	
accordance	with	each	Agreement.’81		What	is	interesting	about	this	statement	is	that	it	does	
not	focus	upon	the	individual	needs	which	a	country	may	have	in	terms	of	benefiting	from	





special	 and	 differential	 treatment	 such	 as	 the	 GSP,	 there	 was	 agreement	 for	 differential	
treatment	to	be	 included	but	the	reasons	for	such	treatment	were	 incompletely	theorised	
with	developed	countries	agreeing	to	such	special	treatment	largely	on	pragmatic	grounds.	
As	 we	 will	 see,	 how	 such	 treatment	 would	 operate	 in	 practice	 would	 also	 remain	
incompletely	 theorised.	 Other	 measures	 of	 SDT	 were	 incompletely	 theorised	 with	
agreement	secured	at	a	lower	level.	In	respect	of	transition	periods,	for	example,	there	was	
agreement	at	a	very	low	level	of	abstraction	on	the	period	of	time	applicable	to	transition	










incomplete	 theorisation	 of	 SDT.	 A	 case	 study	 approach	 is	 adopted	 due	 to	 the	 very	 large	
number	of	SDT	provisions	which	exist	under	 the	 legal	 framework	of	 the	multilateral	 trade	
regime	 and	 the	 limited	 word	 count	 available.	 While	 the	 scope	 of	 the	 case	 study	 is	 by	
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																												


















consequent	 agreement	 on	 what	 such	 treatment	 entails	 in	 particular	 cases.	 There	 is,	 for	
example,	no	direction	given	in	either	the	1971	waiver	decision	or	the	Enabling	Clause	as	to	
whether	it	is	permissible	to	exclude	countries	ab	initio	from	the	grant	of	tariff	preferences.	
Furthermore,	while	 the	Enabling	Clause	 lists	 the	mid-level	principle	 that	preferential	 tariff	
treatment	 should	 serve	 as	 a	 response	 to	 developing	 country	 development,	 financial	 and	
trade	needs,82	 no	direction	 is	 given	as	 to	 the	 sort	of	preferential	 tariff	 treatment	 likely	 to	
achieve	 these	 aims	or	 indeed,	 the	definition	 that	 should	be	 accorded	 to	 such	needs.	 This	
compromise,	reflected	as	an	incompletely	theorised	agreement,	had	the	capacity	to	hide	or	
disguise	the	existence	of	certain	abstractions	such	as	the	fact	that	under	the	GSP,	developed	
country	 ‘donor’	 states	 were	 able	 to	 articulate	 a	 unilateral	 construction	 of	 developing	
country	needs.83	
Linking	the	above	point	with	the	commentary	so	far	on	the	GSP,	it	is	notable	that	discussion	
on	 tariff	 preferences	 has	 referred	 to	 the	 legal	 status	 of	 the	 grant	 of	 preferences	 as	






























preference	 scheme	 to	 differentiate	 between	 developing	 country	 recipients	 of	 such	
preferential	tariff	treatment.	In	seeking	to	answer	this	question,	the	Appellate	Body	looked	
to	the	history	and	objectives	of	the	Enabling	Clause.	In	doing	so,	it	noted	that	Members	are	
encouraged	 to	 deviate	 from	 their	 MFN	 commitments	 in	 the	 pursuit	 of	 special	 and	
differential	 treatment	 in	 favour	 of	 developing	 countries.88	 In	 so	 doing,	 Members	 may	
differentiate	between	GSP	beneficiaries	 in	a	way	 that	 responds	positively	 to	 the	 ‘needs	of	
developing	countries.’89	However,	in	allowing	for	such	differentiation,	‘even	if	constructed	in	
accordance	with	the	notion	that	it	should	act	as	a	positive	response	to	a	relevant	need,	the	
Appellate	 Body	 in	 effect	 sanctioned	 the	 ability	 of	 developed	 countries	 to	 put	 forward	 a	
unilateral	construction	of	‘need’	–	albeit	within	defined	limits	–	in	the	grant	of	preferential	
tariff	 treatment.’90	 Accordingly,	 the	 original	 aims	 of	 the	 GSP	 to	 promote	 growth	 and	
development	have	not	been	delivered	upon.91	
Another	provision	of	SDT	which	illustrates	the	points	made	above	in	relation	to	the	GSP	is	
Article	 15	 of	 the	WTO	 Antidumping	 Agreement	 (ADA)	 which	 directs	 that,	 ‘special	 regard	
must	be	given	by	developed	country	Members	to	the	special	situation	of	developing	country	
Members	 when	 considering	 the	 application	 of	 anti-dumping	 measures	 under	 this	
Agreement.’	 Again,	 we	 may	 posit	 that	 this	 direction	 is	 incompletely	 theorised;	 there	 is	
agreement	 on	 the	 mid-level	 principle	 that	 special	 regard	 should	 be	 had	 to	 developing	
country	Members	but	not	on	the	low	level	principle	of	what	such	regard	actually	requires	or	
indeed,	on	the	more	abstract	 reasons	 for	 the	grant	of	such	treatment.	Article	15	ADA	has	
been	reviewed	by	a	WTO	dispute	settlement	panel	in	US	—	Steel	Plate	which	held	that	the	
provision	 did	 not	 impose	 a	 ‘specific	 or	 general	 obligation	 on	Members	 to	 undertake	 any	
particular	 action.’92	 As	 such,	 ‘Members	 cannot	 be	 expected	 to	 comply	with	 an	 obligation	
whose	parameters	are	entirely	undefined.’93	Under	the	first	sentence	of	this	Article,	to	the	
extent	that	‘special	regard’	should	be	given	to	developing	countries,	such	regard	need	only	
























where	 they	 would	 affect	 the	 essential	 interests	 of	 developing	 country	 Members.’	 With	
regards	to	the	operation	of	this	second	sentence,	the	Panel	in	EC-Bed	Linen	has	held	that;	
In	 our	 view,	while	 the	 exact	 parameters	 of	 the	 term	 are	 difficult	 to	 establish,	 the	
concept	of	 ‘explore’	 clearly	does	not	 imply	 any	particular	outcome.	We	 recall	 that	
Article	15	does	not	require	that	‘constructive	remedies’	must	be	explored,	but	rather	
that	 the	 ‘possibilities’	 of	 such	 remedies	must	 be	 explored,	 which	 further	 suggests	
that	the	exploration	may	conclude	that	no	possibilities	exist,	or	that	no	constructive	
remedies	are	possible,	in	the	particular	circumstances	of	a		given	 case.	 Taken	 in	 its	
context,	 however,	 and	 in	 light	 of	 the	 object	 and	 purpose	 of	 Article	 15,	 we	 do	
consider	 that	 the	 ‘exploration’	 of	 possibilities	must	 be	 actively	 undertaken	 by	 the	
developed	country	authorities	with	a	willingness	to	reach	a	positive	outcome.	Thus,	
in	 our	 view,	 Article	 15	 imposes	 no	 obligation	 to	 actually	 provide	 or	 accept	 any	
constructive	remedy	that	may	be	identified		and/or	 offered.	 It	 does,	 however,	
impose	an	obligation	to	actively	consider,	with	an	open	mind,	the	possibility	of	such	
a	 remedy	 prior	 to	 imposition	 of	 an	 anti-dumping	 measure	 that	 would	 affect	 the	
essential	interests	of	a	developing	country.95	
The	 obligation	 set	 out	 in	 the	 second	 sentence	 of	 Article	 15	 is	 that	 Members	 should	
‘consider’	 the	 possibility	 of	 constructive	 remedies	 where	 the	 imposition	 of	 anti-dumping	
remedies	would	affect	the	essential	interests	of	a	developing	country	Member.	Beyond	such	




‘constructive	 remedies’	 should	 not	 have	 come	 as	 any	 great	 surprise.	 This	 is	 because	 the	
provision	 in	 question	 is	 identical	 to	 Article	 13	 of	 the	 GATT	 Tokyo	 Round	 Code	 on	
Antidumping,	in	relation	to	which	developing	countries	had	expressed	concerns	prior	to	the	
formal	 commencement	 of	 the	 Uruguay	 Round	 of	multilateral	 trade	 negotiations	 that	 the	
normative	obligation	therein	was	not	being	adhered	to.96	
The	relative	ineffectiveness	of	Article	13	of	the	Tokyo	Code	was	underlined	by	a	subsequent	











	GATT,	European	Communities:	 Imposition	of	 anti-dumping	duties	on	 imports	of	 cotton	 yearns	 from	Brazil,	
GATT	Panel	Report,	GATT	Doc.	ADP/137,	adopted	30	October	1995,	para	595.	
98







remedy.	 Again,	 in	 relation	 to	 such	 provisions,	 it	 is	 apparent	 that	 it	 is	 for	 the	 Member	
imposing	anti-dumping	duties	to	decide	what	is	meant	by	the	term	‘constructive	remedies’	
in	respect	of	providing	a	response	to	developing	country	needs.	Under	such	a	narrative,	the	
identification	of	developing	 country	needs	becomes	a	 construct	of	 the	developed	country	
donor	and	not	the	recipient	of	such	‘special’	treatment.		
Article	15	ADA	was	flagged	for	review	under	the	Doha	Round.99	The	specific	review	mandate	
directed	 that	 ‘while	Article	15	of	 the	Agreement	on	 the	 Interpretation	of	Article	VI	of	 the	




operationalize	 this	 provision.’101	 Pursuant	 to	 this,	 the	 ‘Friends	 of	 Anti-dumping’	 group	
proposed	 that	 a	 procedural	 element	 be	 added	 to	 give	 better	 effect	 to	 the	 development	
provisions	 of	 Article	 15102	 while	 the	 African	Group	 put	 forward	 a	more	 detailed	 proposal	
which	 set	 out	 a	more	 comprehensive	 procedure	 as	well	 as	 a	 seemingly	 exhaustive	 list	 of	
‘constructive	remedies’	developed	countries	should	consider	before	applying	anti-dumping	
duties.103	 Of	 the	 three	 Implementation	 Issues	 the	 Committee	 on	 Anti-Dumping	 Practices	




be	 had	 to	 the	 situation	 of	 developing	 countries,	 the	 component	 of	 the	 provision	 which	
relates	to	 ‘how’	such	needs	should	be	taken	 into	account	was	 left	 incompletely	theorised.	
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to	 operationalise	 the	 provision	 was	 the	 existence	 of	 significant	 inequality	 whereby	
developed	countries	were	able	to	articulate	unilaterally	a	‘suitable	response’	to	the	concept	
of	developing	country	needs.	
The	 trend	 identified	 above	may	 also	 be	 seen	 in	 respect	 of	 other	 provisions	 of	 the	WTO	
covered	 agreements	which	 direct	 that	 technical	 assistance	 be	 granted	 to	 developing	 and	
least-developed	countries.	An	example	can	be	found	in	TRIPS	Article	67	pursuant	to	which	
developed	 countries	 were	 tasked	 to	 provide	 on	 request	 and	 on	 mutually	 agreed	 terms	
technical	and	financial	assistance	to	developing	and	least	developed	countries	to	meet	their	
implementation	needs.	The	vagueness	of	the	direction	under	Article	67	has	resulted	in	the	
provision	 of	 assistance	which	 at	 times	 did	more	 to	 favour	 the	 interests	 of	 the	 developed	
country	grantor	than	the	specific	needs	of	the	developing	country	at	issue.105	The	relatively	
voluntary	nature	of	technical	assistance,	despite	frequent	use	of	the	verb	‘shall’	in	regard	to	
the	 direction	 to	 provide	 such	 assistance,	 became	 a	 particular	 bone	 of	 contention	 by	
developing	country	beneficiaries.	The	 lack	of	a	binding	and	 justiciable	commitment	on	the	
part	of	developed	countries	to	provide	technical	assistance	to	their	developing	counterparts	





their	negotiating	heritage.	The	Secretariat	note	 cited	earlier	 in	 this	 article	 contended	 that	
the	 special	 and	 differential	 treatment	 provisions	 of	 the	 WTO	 covered	 agreements	 are	
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used	 with	 Article	 11	 in	 both	 documents	 making	 provision	 for	 the	 grant	 of	 technical	
assistance	while	Article	12	sets	out	the	availability	of	special	and	differential	treatment	for	
developing	countries.	The	difference,	of	course,	between	the	Tokyo	Round	Codes	and	the	
Uruguay	 Round	 Agreements	 is	 that	 while	 the	 former	 were	 voluntary	 plurilateral	
agreements,	the	latter	were	multilateral	and	mandatory	for	all	Members.	
The	 problem	 with	 the	 Uruguay	 Round	 TBT	 Agreement	 utilising	 essentially	 the	 same	
provisions	 of	 assistance	 to	 those	 found	 under	 the	 Tokyo	 Round	 Code	 is	 that	 prior	 to	 the	
formation	of	the	WTO	TBT	Agreement,	concerns	were	raised	that	the	provisions	of	the	GATT	
Standards	Code	may	not	be	appropriate	in	meeting	developing	country	needs.	According	to	




Technical	 Barriers	 to	 Trade	 held	 to	 review	 the	 effectiveness	 of	 the	 Code	 as	 well	 as	 any	
obstacles	 to	 acceptance	 developing	 countries	may	 have	 faced,	 it	 was	 acknowledged	 that	
developing	 countries	 had	 experienced	 particular	 administrative	 difficulties	 in	 the	
implementation	 process.112	 	 It	 was	 similarly	 recognised	 that,	 ‘Parties	 considered	 that	 any	
action	 to	 make	 the	 implementation	 of	 the	 provisions	 of	 the	 Agreement	 on	 technical	
assistance	more	 effective	would	 also	 be	 of	 value	 in	 improving	 decision-making	 processes	
and	in	facilitating	the	establishment	of	efficient	information	exchange	systems	in	developing	
countries.’113	 While	 several	 countries	 received	 technical	 assistance	 to	 help	 in	 their	
implementation	 of	 Code	 and	 expressed	 their	 gratitude	 for	 this	 help,	 others	 were	 more	
circumspect	 in	 their	 praise	 and	 called	 for	 ‘special	 efforts’	 to	 be	 made	 to	 improve	 the	
operation	of	its	provisions.114	
Given	 that	 the	 Tokyo	Round	 Standards	 Code	was	 signed	 by	 less	 than	 forty	 countries,	 the	
overwhelming	majority	of	which	were	industrialised,	the	logic	of	transplanting	its	provisions	
of	 assistance	 into	 the	 Uruguay	 Round	 Agreement,	 particularly	 given	 the	 more	 extensive	
coverage	of	the	latter	Agreement	is	somewhat	questionable.	The	question	therefore	has	to	




















had	only	 a	 limited	 knowledge	of	 developing	 country	 expertise	 and	experience	 in	 this	 and	
other	 ‘new’	 areas.115	 Furthermore,	 the	 formulation	 of	 these	 provisions	 was	 undoubtedly	
underpinned	by	the	narrative	that	‘one	size	fits	all,’	a	narrative	which	to	a	large	extent	was	a	
‘central	pillar	of	the	Uruguay	Round.’116	To	this	end,	the	focus	of	negotiations	was	to	identify	
specific	 rules	 which	 could	 be	 implemented	 across	 the	 board,	 as	 opposed	 to	 finding	 an	
accommodation	 which	 suited	 individual	 country	 needs.117	 It	 is	 hence	 apparent	 that	 the	




exceptions	 to	 the	 normal	 rules	 of	 the	 trade	 regime,	 developed	 countries	 were	 able	 to	
construct	 the	 trade	 regime	 according	 to	 their	 own	 vision.	 This,	 in	 the	 words	 of	 Lamp,	
‘allowed	 them	 to	 preserve	 their	 preferred	 design	 of	 the	 trade	 regime…	 while	 keeping	
developing	countries	within	the	system.’119	Hence,	developing	country	demands	under	the	
GATT	 for	 a	 different	 kind	 of	 trade	 regime	were	 conceptualised	 as	 outside	what	 has	 been	
termed	the	‘normal’	trade	regime.	This	therefore	set	the	scene	for	the	eradication	of	such	
difference	under	 the	Uruguay	Round	with	 the	SDT	provisions	 therein	designed	to	assist	 in	
implementation	 the	 WTO	 agreements	 rather	 than	 offer	 an	 alternative	 vision	 for	 the	
multilateral	trade	regime.		
What	 the	differential	 treatment	provisions	of	 the	GSP,	Article	67	of	 the	TRIPS	Agreement,	
Articles	11	and	12	of	the	TBT	and,	Article	15	ADA	have	in	common	is	their	construction	as	






in	 respect	 of	 the	 principle	 that	 Members	 ‘shall’	 facilitate,	 for	 example,	 the	 trade	
opportunities	of	developing	countries	but	the	theory	which	accounts	for	such	treatment	is	
under-theorised	 and	 there	 is	 little	 direction	 given	 as	 to	 ‘how’	 this	 principle	 may	 be	
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incomplete	 theorisation	 did	 little	 to	 promote	 stability	 but	 instead	 led	 to	 normatively	
troubling	 accusations	 of	 bias	 and	 inconsistency	 in	 how	 developing	 and	 least-developed	
country	needs	were	addressed121	and	also	prompted	a	review	of	SDT	under	paragraph	44	of	
the	Doha	Round	mandate.		
As	 articulated	 by	 Sunstein,	 ‘fuller	 theorisation’	 of	 an	 issue	 may	 be	 of	 benefit	 so	 as	 to	
promote	 a	 ‘wider	 and	 deeper	 inquiry	 into	 the	 grounds	 for	 judgment’	 so	 as	 to	 prevent	
‘inconsistency,	bias,	or	 self	 interest.’122	 In	 the	next	and	penultimate	section	of	 this	article,	




In	 the	above	section,	we	drew	attention	 to	 the	 incompletely	 theorised	nature	of	SDT.	We	
also	elucidated	upon	the	ramifications	of	this,	detailing	how	the	provisions	became	tainted	
with	 self-interest,	 bias	 and	 inconsistency.	 The	 normatively	 troubling	 aspects	 of	 the	 legal	
construction	of	SDT	in	this	way	were	alluded	to,	as	were	some	of	the	efforts	under	the	Doha	
Round	 to	more	 fully	 theorise	 SDT.	 In	 this	penultimate	 section,	we	 seek	 to	draw	upon	 the	
lessons	 learned	 in	 the	above	 section	 to	ponder	 the	question,	what	next	 for	 SDT?	 Is	more	








subsidies	 which	 aim	 to,	 ‘prohibit	 certain	 forms	 of	 fisheries	 subsidies	 which	 contribute	 to	














refrain	 from	 introducing	 new	 such	 subsidies.’124	 These	 negotiations	 recognize	 that,	
‘appropriate	 and	 effective	 special	 and	 differential	 treatment	 for	 developing	 and	 least-
developed	Members	should	be	an	integral	part	of	the	fisheries	subsidies	negotiations.’125	
	




the	TFA	are	 such	 that	 it	 is	 estimated	 to	expand	 trade	by	$1	 trillion.127	 Perhaps	of	 greater	
significance,	at	 least	for	our	purpose,	 is	the	approach	taken	to	SDT	under	the	TFA.	 	 In	this	
respect,	 under	 the	 TFA,	 developing	 and	 least	 developed	 countries	 are	 able	 to	 tie	
implementation	 of	 its	 provisions	 to	 the	 receipt	 of	 technical	 assistance	 and	 capacity	
building.128	 From	 a	 WTO	 perspective,	 this	 is	 a	 unique	 feature	 of	 the	 agreement	 and	







negotiations	 on	 SDT.131	 The	 SDT	 provisions	 under	 it	 certainly	 have	 evolved	 from	 merely	
‘perfunctorily	 addressing	 the	 genuine	 concerns	 of	 developing	 country	 members	 to	
recognising	the	need	to	provide	structured	and	mandated	support…”132	Perhaps,	however,	
of	greater	significance	is	the	overturning	of	the	notion	of	‘special’	treatment	under	the	TFA.	
To	 expand,	 and	 drawing	 on	 the	 work	 of	 Nicolas	 Lamp,	 developing	 countries	 have	







	 For	 a	 useful	 summary	 of	 the	 TFA,	 see	 WTO,	 ‘The	 Trade	 Facilitation	 Agreement:	 An	 Overview’	
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tradfa_e/tradfatheagreement_e.htm	accessed	22	June	2017.	
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members.133	Why	 then,	 is	 accommodating	 the	needs	of	developing	not	 conceptualised	as	
‘the	‘normal’	approach,	the	default	option,	in	multilateral	trade	lawmaking?’134		
	
If	 the	 TFA	 can	 be	 said	 to	 offer	 a	 new	 paradigm	 for	 trade	 law	making,	 it	 is	 in	 the	 move	
towards	developing	country	and	LDC	concerns	being	treated	as	part	of	the	normal	routine	
of	multilateral	 trade	negotiations	rather	 than	through	the	 lens	of	exceptions	and	opt	outs	
from	the	‘normal’	trade	regime	defined	by	developed	country	interests.135	It	also	allows	us	
to	 move	 beyond	 the	 Uruguay	 Round	 conceptualisation	 of	 SDT	 as	 concerned	 with	 the	








in	 future	WTO	Agreements	without	 at	 least	 considering	 the	 TF	model.	 The	 inclusive,	 de–
centralized	 way	 of	 conducting	 the	 talks	 is	 also	 likely	 to	 set	 new	 standards	 in	 the	 trade	
negotiating	 business.’140	 What	 remains	 to	 be	 seen,	 however,	 are	 the	 mechanics	 of	 such	
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Therefore,	 in	 answering	 the	 question	 of	 ‘where	 or	what	 next’	 for	 SDT,	 a	 tension	may	 be	
identified.	The	negotiations	on	 the	TFA,	 for	example,	point	 to	a	more	 inclusive	manner	of	
conducting	trade	negotiations	whereby	developing	country	needs,	as	encapsulated	in	SDT,	
were	 very	much	 to	 the	 fore	 in	 the	 final	 text	 of	 the	 Agreement.	 SDT	 is	 more	 completely	
theorised	under	the	text	of	the	TFA	but	whether	this	approach	will	be	replicated	in	future	
areas	 of	 trade	 law	 making	 is	 uncertain.	 What	 is	 clear,	 however,	 is	 that	 the	
under/incompletely	theorised	approach	to	the	traditional	form	of	SDT	examined	above	was	
a	 choice.	 The	 TFA	 hence	 demonstrates	 that	 it	 is	 possible	 to	 make	 another	 choice;	 to	







and	 differential	 treatment	 on	 a	 general	 level.	 These	 question	 marks	 are	 of	 considerable	
consequence	as	the	political	economy	of	the	trade	regime	is	likely	to	see	seismic	shifts	in	the	
coming	 years	 stemming	 from,	 among	 other	 things,	 the	 uncertainty	 surrounding	 the	 U.S.	
administration’s	 trade	 policy.	 Some,	 for	 example,	 have	 questioned	 whether	 the	 U.S	







My	analysis	 suggests	 that	 the	 traditional	 form	of	 SDT	under	 the	multilateral	 trade	 regime	
can	be	conceptualised	through	the	lens	provided	by	Sunstein’s	construct	of	the	incompletely	
theorised	agreement.	In	this	regard,	we	reviewed	a	range	of	SDT	provisions	and	found	that	
that	 they	 were	 constructed	 as	 an	 incompletely	 theorised	 agreement;	 that	 is,	 there	 was	
agreement	 on	principles	 such	 as	 non-reciprocity	 or	 preferential	 tariff	 treatment	 but	what	
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as	 inequality	or	 injustice,	resulting	 in	an	erosion	of	the	stability	underlying	the	agreement.	
This	was	 indeed	 the	 case	as	we	demonstrated	 in	our	 review	of	 a	 range	of	 SDT	provisions	
which	permitted	a	unilateral	construction	of	developing	country	needs	to	be	put	forward	by	
developed	 country	 donors.	 We	 further	 identified	 transition	 periods	 as	 a	 type	 of	
incompletely	theorised	agreement.	What	was	incompletely	theorised	was	the	higher	order	
principles	of	why	such	treatment	should	be	granted	in	the	first	place	with,	as	acknowledged	
by	 the	 Secretariat,	 SDT	 failing	 to	 operate	 as	 a	 general	 principle.	 This	 lack	 of	 incomplete	
theorisation	 led	 to	 a	 failure	 to	 enquire	 as	 to	 the	 suitability	 of	 such	measures	 to	 address	
developing	country	needs.		
The	conceptual	frame	provided	by	the	incompletely	theorised	agreement	also	allowed	us	to	
interrogate	 the	 failings	 of	 SDT	 and	 how	 the	 incompletely	 theorised	 construction	 of	 these	
provisions	 led	to	accusations	of	bias,	 inconsistency	and	self-interest.	 In	this	regard,	we	are	
reminded	by	Sunstein	that	the	benefits	of	an	incompletely	theorised	agreement	will	at	times	
be	 limited.	As	 such,	 ‘fuller	 theorisation’	of	an	 issue	may	be	of	benefit	 so	as	 to	promote	a	
‘wider	and	deeper	 inquiry	 into	 the	grounds	 for	 judgment’	 so	as	 to	prevent	 ‘inconsistency,	
bias,	or	self	interest.’	
It	is	clear	that	fuller	theorisation	of	SDT	is	required	in	order	to	address	its	deficiencies.	As	we	
discussed	above,	 a	 review	process	of	 SDT	was	 initiated	under	 the	Doha	Round	 though	 its	
results	 are	 still	 pending.145	 In	 contrast	 to	 this	 rather	 stalled	 negotiating	 mandate,	 we	
examined	 the	 provisions	 of	 the	 new	 Trade	 Facilitation	 Agreement,	 elucidating	 upon	 how	
SDT	forms	a	central	component	of	the	Agreement’s	provisions.	We	evaluated	how	the	type	
of	SDT	offered	under	the	TFA	is	more	completely	theorised	and,	as	such,	has	the	potential	to	
act	 as	 a	 new	 paradigm	 for	 multilateral	 trade	 law	making	 whereby	 developing	 and	 least-
developed	 country	 needs	 are	 more	 completely	 theorised	 and,	 in	 the	 words	 of	 Lamp,	
become	 a	 normal	 part	 of	 negotiations.146	 The	 extent	 that	 this	 potential	 new	 paradigm	 is	
adopted	 depends	 largely	 on	 the	 political	 will	 of	 the	WTO	membership.	 It	 was	 therefore	
stated	 that	SDT	resides	within	a	 liminal	 state	with	 the	 term	 liminal	 intended	to	evoke	 the	
idea	of	transition.	












possibility	 whereby	 SDT	 is	 not	 merely	 ad	 hoc	 or	 ‘tokenseque’147	 but	 rather	 is	 more	
completely	 theorised	 so	 as	 to	 address	 the	 needs	 of	 developing	 and	 least-developed	
countries	as	part	of	the	‘normal’	course	of	multilateral	trade	law	making.148		
The	 second	 point	 relates	 to	 the	 liminality	 of	 SDT;	 it	 is	 likely	 helpful	 to	 think	 of	 GATT	
differential	 and	 more	 favourable	 treatment	 as	 a	 type	 of	 first	 generation	 SDT	 and	 the	
Uruguay	 Round	 agreements	 provisions	 on	 differential	 treatment	 as	 a	 second	 generation	






so	 as	 to	 channel	 debate	 on	 the	 development	 of	 this	 area	 of	 trade	 law	 and	 practice.	 This	
article	 begins	 this	 quest	 for	 new	 conceptual	 tools	 by	 analysing	 Sunstein’s	 incompletely	
theorised	 agreement	which,	 as	we	 have	 seen,	 provides	 a	 powerful	 critical	 framework	 for	
analysing	such	provisions	in	the	future.		
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